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Perceptual Bases 
of 
Visual Literacy 
by 
Paul Messaris 
Anyone with a scholarly interest in 
visual literacy is likely to have come 
across more than one story about 
people from pre-industrial societies 
who reportedly were unable to make 
any sense of their first encounters with 
photographs - even when those 
photographs were of very familiar 
subjects (e.g., see Deregowski, 1980; 
Segall et al., 1966). Such accounts may 
be seen as evidence in favor of the 
proposition that the representational 
conventions of photographs and other 
kinds of pictures are largely or wholly 
arbitrary, despite the fact that viewers 
familiar with a particular pictorial style 
may think of it as being "natural" or 
"true to life." This view of pictures as 
an arbitrary system of signification was 
expressed as early as 1925 by the art 
historian Erwin Panofsky, in a 
celebrated essay on Renaissance 
perspective, but its most influential 
exponent has probably been the 
philosopher Nelson Goodman (1976). 
Image-Reality Discrepancies 
As Panofsky, Goodman, and other 
writers (e.g., Gombrich, 1960; Snyder, 
1980; Wartofsky, 1984) have pointed 
out, many pictorial styles do indeed 
entail sharp discrepancies between 
image and reality. A minimal Jist of 
245 
these discrepancies would encompass 
the following three broad areas: 
(1) Discrepancies in Color and 
Rlumination. For example, black-and-
white photographs contain no 
information about the hue of colors, 
while unshaded outline drawings are 
uninformative about both color and 
illumination. 
(2) Discrepancies in Depth Cues. 
Because pictures which attempt to 
represent three-dimensional scenes 
must do so on a flat, two-dimensional 
surface, all pictures Jack some of the 
informational cues from which we infer 
the third dimension in real-world 
perception. (The nature of these cues 
will be descnbed below.) 
(3) Discrepancies in Shape. In many 
kinds of pictures, across a broad range 
of cultures and styles, the shapes of 
pictured objects are conventionally 
rendered very differently from the 
shapes of their real-world 
counterparts. Stick figures and most 
children's cartoons are good examples 
of this process. 
In view of such discrepancies, it 
may seem intuitively reasonable to 
suppose that viewers who are not 
familiar with a particular pictorial style 
will be likely to have problems in 
interpreting pictures in that style. In 
other words, it may seem that we have 
here a good argument in support of the 
conclusion that pictorial conventions 
containing such discrepancies are 
indeed · arbitrary, as Panofsky, 
Goodman, and their followers have 
claimed. As it happens, however, this 
conclusion has been contradicted 
repeatedly by a growing body of 
empirical evidence. 
Over the past thirty years, more 
than a dozen studies have directly 
investigated how inexperienced 
viewers - including children, people 
from societies without mass media, and 
even animal subjects - respond to each 
of the three types of pictorial 
discrepancy listed above. Contrary to 
what one might have expected -- and 
contrary, also, to the outcomes of the 
anecdotal reports mentioned earlier -
these studies have found that 
inexperienced viewers are typically not 
troubled by the first and third types of 
discrepancy. In other words, they 
typically do not find it difficult to 
recognize the content of such things as 
black-and-white photographs, outline 
drawings, stick figures, and cartoons 
(provided the objects represented in 
these pictures are culturally familiar, of 
course). Only the perception of depth 
(i.e., the third dimension) in pictures is 
likely to be problematic for 
inexperienced viewers, although even 
this difficulty is by no means inevitable. 
Explaining the Research 
What could account for these 
findings? As Hagen (1980) has pointed 
out, investigators working in this area 
of research tend to be concerned with 
empirical details rather than with 
theoretical expUcation or synthesis. 
However, even before most of this 
research had been conducted, 
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Gombrich (1960) had articulated a 
theoretical framework which turns out, 
in retrospect, to have been a promising 
way of approaching the research 
findings. The basic hypothesis explored 
by Gombrich was -that, even if a picture 
does not look very much like the thing 
it is meant to represent, it may 
nonetheless provide to the eye and 
brain informational cues which are 
similar to those used in the perception 
of the real world. For example, 
perhaps the structural information 
contained in a stick figure (the relative 
length and position of the various body 
parts) is meaningful by itself to any 
perceiver (including someone who has 
never seen such a picture before). In 
other words, a crucial assumption 
underlying this approach is that of 
modularity: Perhaps our perceptual 
apparatus operates on the basis of 
discrete informational cues (about 
structure, about depth, etc.), so that, 
even if some of these cues are absent 
from a particular visual display (e.g., a 
picture), perception can proceed 
unimpeded with regard to the other 
parts of the display. 
This view of picture perception is 
very different from the kind of 
approach exemplified by Goodman 
and his followers. It suggests that a 
broad range of pictorial conventions 
which may seem at first blush to be 
arbitrary are actually derivatives of 
real-world perceptual processes. It also 
suggests, therefore, that the continuity 
between skills of pictorial 
interpretation - which may be seen as 
one of the building blocks of visual 
literacy - and real-world perceptual 
processes may be much greater than 
someone like Goodman might imagine. 
Although Gombrich's assumptions 
appeared to fit in well with a variety of 
observations in perceptual psychology 
as well as art history, he himself was 
initially quite tentative about these 
assumptions, because the state of 
scientilic knowledge about visual 
perception was too inconclusive at the 
time to allow him to take a finn 
position. His subsequent encounter 
with the work of J.J. Gibson (1982) has 
dispelled much of this tentativeness 
(e.g., see Gombrich, 1984). However, 
for a fuller assessment of the adequacy 
of Gombrich's approach, we must turn 
to more recent developments in 
perceptual psychology. The past 
decade has seen major advances in the 
theory of vision, stemming most 
notably from the work of the late 
David Marr of M.I.T. (See Marr, 1982, 
for the most accessible account of 
Marr's basic theory.) These theoretical 
advances have resulted in a significant 
reconceptualization of the visual 
process, with direct implications for the 
issue which concerns us here, viz., the 
degree of continuity between real-
world (unmediated) perception and 
the perception of pictures. 
The Visual Process 
The specific aspect of VISion 
theory from which this connection 
emerges has to do with the brain's 
"translation" of the retinal image into a 
mental representation of identifiable 
objects in three-dimensional space. 
Marr's model of this process comprises 
three discrete steps. In the first step, 
the brain scans the visual information 
transmitted to it from the retina -- i.e., 
essentially a two-dimensional array of 
color and light values -- in search of 
discontinuities corresponding to the 
outlines of objects or the edges of 
surfaces. The end result of this stage of 
the visual process is a mental 
representation which Marr labels the 
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"primal sketch" and which can be 
thought of as being equivalent to an 
outJine drawing of the scene which the 
eyes are looking at. All further mental 
operations aimed at identifyii}g the 
objects in the ·scene and inferring the 
scene's three-dimensional properties 
are conducted on the basis of this 
outline representation. 
In other words, here we have an 
affirmation of Gombrich's assumption 
of modularity in visual processing: The 
ability to recognize objects and see 
three-dimensionally without reference 
to most details of light or color is 
actually built into our real-world visual 
apparatus. On the basis of this 
principle it seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that a pictorially 
inexperienced viewer should not in fact 
be hampered by the absence of color 
and/or shading in black-and-white 
photographs, outline drawings, etc., 
and, as already noted, systematic 
research - as opposed to anecdotal 
evidence has supported this 
hypothesis (e.g., see Dusenbury, 1990; 
Hochberg and Brooks, 1962; Spain, 
1983; Zimmerman and Hochberg, 
1970). 
Depth Perception 
Step two in Marr's model of the 
visual process is concerned with 
computing depth -- i.e., the third 
dimension in the outline 
representation resulting from step one. 
This computation makes use of several 
types of information, or "depth cues," 
but for present purposes the following 
four are the most relevant ones: 
(1) Binocular Disparity. Because the 
retinal image registered in the left eye 
is slightly different from that of the 
right eye (since the two eY.es' points of 
view differ), and ~cause the 
magnitude of this difference in retinal 
images is inversely related to our 
distance from whatever it is we are 
looking at, the brain can use this 
difference in its computation of depth. 
(2) Motion Parallax. Any change in the 
relative position of the viewer vis-a-vis 
the thing being viewe.d is accompanied 
by a change in the retinal image of that 
thing. Because the magnitude of the 
retinal change is also inversely related 
to distance (between viewer and thing 
viewed), it too can serve as a depth 
cue. 
(3) Texture Gradients. Whenever we 
look at a scene containing a regular 
texture or pattern (e.g., a tiled floor, a 
picket fence, railroad ties, or even such 
naturally-occurring patterns as 
uniform-sized pebbles on a beach), the 
retinal image of that pattern will 
increase in density as distance 
increases. These variations in apparent 
density can serve as informational cues 
regarding the distance between the 
observer and the various parts of the 
scene she or he is looking at. 
(4) Occlusion. When one object blocks 
our view of another object, we know 
that the former is closer to us than the 
latter. This is a trivially obvious, but 
nonetheless compelling, source of 
information about the three-
dimensional properties of the scene we 
are looking at. 
It should be readily apparent that 
the first two of these depth cues cannot 
possibly be incorporated into any 
ordinary, non-holographic still picture 
(although pairs of images viewed 
through 3-D glasses or other 
stereoscopic devices can of course 
mimic the effect of binocular 
disparity.) If our brain required the 
simultaneous operation of all four cues 
in order to compute depth, we would 
be forced to conclude that the 
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perception of depth in still images 
must be an impossible task for 
pictorially inexperienced viewers. 
However, once again the principle of 
modularity comes into play here. · 
As Marr and others have noted 
(e.g., see Kubovy, 1986), there is good 
reason to believe that these depth cues 
can indeed operate independently of 
one another. Consequently, if a 
particular picture contains enough 
information about depth in the form of 
texture gradients and/or occlusion, 
inexperienced viewers should not find 
it difficult to see depth in that picture. 
A picture meeting these criteria has 
been tested in a study conducted in 
New Guinea by Cook (1981), and the 
results supported this assumption. On 
the other hand, of course, when texture 
gradients and occlusion are either 
entirely absent from a picture or are 
not sufficiently informative to generate 
an adequate sense of three-
dimensional space, we should not be 
surprised to find that inexperienced 
viewers do not perceive depth in that 
picture. This assumption, too, has been 
confirmed experimentally (see 
Hudson, 1967; also Hagen and 
Johnson, 1977; Hamdi et al., 1982; 
Mshelia and Lapidus, 1990). 
Object Identification 
The third and final step in the 
visual process which concerns us here 
entails the identification of the various 
objects in the visual field. This part of 
the process is not yet understood as 
well as the previous two, but what is 
known about it does permit us to say 
that Gombrich appears to have been 
correct in speculating that structure 
alone -- without surface details -- might 
be a sufficient basis for object 
recognition. 
As described by Marr, the brain's 
activity at this stage in the visual 
process consists of "reducing" the 
outlin~s of objects into a more 
elementary representational form in 
which only the basic underlying 
structure is retained, while many 
incidental details are discarded. (In 
other words, at this point the brain's 
processing of visual information goes 
beyond the outline format which was 
the result of step one.) These more 
basic structural representations are 
then matched against a "dictionary" of 
object structures in the brain's 
memory. Thus, two different outlines 
will lead to the same ultimate labelling 
of an object so long as their underlying 
structures match; and it is this feature 
of real-world vision which is assumed 
to account for our ability to recognize a 
particular object in any number of 
different circumstances (e.g., different 
points of view, different levels of 
illumination, etc.). 
When it comes to specifically 
pictorial variations in the appearance 
of an object, then - e.g., the 
transformations entailed in stick 
figures, cartoons, sketches, etc. --
Marr's theory suggests that a viewer's 
ability to interpret such pictures may 
be an extension of an everyday, real-
world perceptual skill, rather than 
something one has to learn through 
previous experience with similar 
pictures. It follows, therefore, that 
inexperienced viewers should be able 
to recognize the objects in such 
pictures without much difficulty -- and, 
as noted earlier, this has indeed been 
found to be true in studies of this issue 
(Cook, 1981; Kennedy and Ross, 
1975). 
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Implicadons 
We have seen that a broad variety 
of pictorial styles which may seem, 
intuitively, to entail major departures 
from the appearance of the real world 
- e.g., black-and-white photographs, 
outline drawings, stick figures, cartoons 
- do not appear to pose significant 
interpretational obstacles to viewers 
unfamiliar with those styles. This 
observation, which has been confirmed 
by a growing body of empirical 
investigations, goes against the 
implications of certain oft-cited 
anecdotal accounts about first-time 
viewers' responses to photographs and 
other kinds of images. Does the 
argument developed in this paper 
imply that these anecdotal accounts 
were exaggerations or even 
fabrications? Not necessarily. As 
Deregowski et al. (1972) have shown in 
a detailed study of this issue, it is quite 
likely that the viewers' puzzlement 
reported in these accounts was due to 
lack of familiarity with the pictorial 
media - typically, paper - rather than 
being a response to the actual content 
of the pictures. This view has been 
supported by recent research in an 
isolated rural area in Kenya (R. 
Hobbs, personal communication, 
1992). 
What are the broader implications 
of the issues examined in this paper? It 
has been argued that the skills required 
for the interpretation of the 
conventions of pictorial representation 
may be, to a significant extent, 
derivatives of real-world perceptual 
processes, rather than arbitrary, 
picture-specific mental habits. To the 
extent that this is true, pictures may be 
thought of as being, in that regard, a 
more readily accessible mode of 
communication than language, whose 
semantic and syntactic codes are 
almost exclusively arbitrary. Does this 
greater accessibility of pictorial 
communication imply that the social 
need for. visual literacy is Jess than the 
need for verbal skills? H anything, the 
contrary should be true. Precisely 
because of their greater accessibiJity to 
the untutored viewer, images as a 
mode of communication may be 
unmatched in their capacity for 
manipulation and misinformation (see 
Messaris, 1992; in press). The need for 
visual literacy in its broadest sense --
i.e., as reflective, critical awareness of 
visual conventions and their uses 
should be correspondingly acute. 
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